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ABSTRACT 
Communication has been shown to enhance cooperation (Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee 1977; Isaac 
and Walker 1988; Sally 1995; Bochet, Page and Putterman 2006). But do all people benefit equally 
from communication? This thesis experimentally investigates two main research questions. First, how 
does chat room communication affect cooperation between two individuals in a social dilemma? 
Second, are individuals with different cooperative dispositions affected differently by 
communication? I also explore how potential partners use language to affect each other’s behaviour. 
I conduct an experiment to answer these questions.  
The experiment consists of three parts. In the first part, I elicit subjects’ cooperative dispositions. In 
the second part, I study participants’ cooperative behaviour in a two-person repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma. All subjects are randomly placed in potential pairs of two. Each subject may choose to form 
a mutual partnership with the other person before engaging in the prisoner’s dilemma. Half of the 
pairs may communicate with each other through a chat room prior to the partner choice. In the third 
and final part of the experiment, I re-elicit subjects’ cooperative dispositions.  
Results show that communication does not increase the overall probability of successfully forming a 
mutual partnership or subjects’ overall payoff. However, subjects’ average contributions are higher 
when they may communicate with their potential partner. More specifically, subjects classified as 
Cooperators in the first part of the experiment contribute significantly more when able to 
communicate, compared to Cooperators who cannot. Free Riders who may communicate are more 
likely to form mutual partnerships and they earn a higher payoff than Free Riders who may not 
communicate.  
The experiment is computerized using the experimental program z-Tree 3.6.7 (Fischbacher 2007). 
Results are analysed using the statistical software STATA/IC 14.2 and Microsoft Excel 16.12. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
I get the benefit only if I can persuade others to help me, and I can only get others to help 
me by giving them information [beyond the here and now]. If we can cooperate, we all 
gain; if not, we all lose. (Bickerton 2009, 166) 
When there is a conflict between social and individual interest, one might gain from cooperation 
in the long run, even when there is a potential one-time payoff from cheating (Tullock 1985). 
Communication enhances such cooperative behaviour as language may be used by individuals 
to persuade one another to work together for a common end (Wilson and Harris 2017). 
When we face a complex situation involving many individuals, communication may facilitate 
a solution to a coordination problem. In these complex situations, communication may also 
facilitate social pressure, shaming and group pressure. All these factors make the positive effect 
of communication on cooperation, difficult to explain in a situation involving many individuals 
(Sally 1995). 
However, most of our daily encounters are not as complicated. When we interact with a co-
worker, friend or spouse, there is only one person to make a mutual agreement with. If so, there 
is no coordination problem and no obvious reason why the effect of communication itself, on 
cooperation, might be “tainted” by other factors, such as group pressure.  
This thesis experimentally investigates how communication affects the cooperation between 
two individuals who may mutually choose to cooperate, where having no partner leads to 
exclusion. More importantly, I examine whether communication affects individuals with 
different cooperative dispositions differently.  
A key question motivating this thesis, is not only if communication affects cooperation, but also 
how participants use language to affect each other’s behaviour towards a common benefit, 
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rather than pursuing one’s own interest. As the successful formation of a partnership depends 
on the two potential partners mutually choosing each other, the focus shifts from choosing a 
partner, to the desire of being chosen. I suggest that individuals may use communication as a 
commitment and promise-giving device that upholds one’s desire to be chosen by others.  
I conduct an experiment, consisting of three parts. In PART I, I elicit subjects’ cooperative type. 
PART II is designed to explore how pre-play communication affects cooperation. The design 
makes successful cooperation fairly simple to achieve.  I minimize the coordination problem 
by randomly placing two and two subjects in potential partnerships. However, only those who 
mutually choose one another, engage in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Those who do not form a 
mutual partnership, are excluded from the current period. The game continues for ten periods.  
Two subjects who can form a partnership are randomly assigned to either the “Communication” 
or the “No communication” condition. Subjects in a potential pair assigned to the 
“Communication” condition, may communicate with each other through a chat room prior to 
the partner choice in each period. Those assigned to the “No communication” condition, may 
not communicate with each other. In PART III, I re-elicit participants’ cooperative type. 
Results show that pre-play communication is positively associated with increased overall 
contributions. More specifically, Cooperators contribute more, when able to communicate, 
compared to Cooperators who may not communicate. Finally, pre-play communication does 
not affect payoff or subjects’ probability of successfully forming a mutual partnership, overall. 
However, Free Riders who may communicate with their potential partner, are more likely to 
form a mutual partnership and they are granted higher payoffs, compared to Free Riders who 
are not able to communicate.  
The conversation topic that occurs most frequently in the chat room is Commitment and 
Recruitment words, mostly used by Cooperators. Singular Pronouns (e.g. I and you) is the 
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second most prevalent conversation topic, mostly used by Free Riders. Other frequently used 
conversation topics are Earnings and Tactics as well as Plural Pronouns (e.g. we and us).  
This thesis yields three main contributions to the experimental literature on cooperation and 
communication. First, how chat room communication affects cooperation between two 
individuals. Second, whether individuals with different cooperative dispositions perform 
differently when they may communicate, compared to those who cannot communicate. Third, 
how individuals use communication to attract potential partners.  
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 offers an overview of the related 
experimental literature. Chapter 3 provides a summary of the experimental design and 
procedure of the controlled lab experiment as well as the procedure for classification of 
cooperative types. Chapter 4 presents the main findings regarding the effect of communication, 
overall, and for different cooperative types. I explore the language subjects use in the chat room, 
in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains some concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED LITERATURE 
 
2.1 THE EFFECT OF COMMUNICATION 
Findings from related literature show that communication enhance cooperative behaviour in 
social dilemmas (Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee 1977; Isaac and Walker 1988; Sally 1995; 
Bochet, Page and Putterman 2006). Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977) investigate how 
communication affects subjects’ behaviour in an eight-person commons dilemma. They find 
that defection from cooperation is significantly lower when individuals are able to communicate 
relevant information with each other, compared to the conditions where no communication or 
only irrelevant communication is allowed.  
Similarly, Isaac and Walker (1988) find that people increase their individual contributions and 
cooperate more efficiently, thereby improving group optimality significantly, when they are 
able to communicate freely. In a meta-analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992, Sally (1995) 
find that communication significantly increase cooperation by 45 percentage points in repeated 
games. Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006) investigate the effect of communication in an N-
person game. They also find that communication significantly increase cooperation.  
Furthermore, the effect of communication depends on the communication medium. 
Communication seems to be most efficient when the subjects are not anonymous, and are able 
to express both their voice and facial expressions. Thus, face-to-face communication is found 
to increase cooperation most efficiently (Sally 1995; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1998; Bochet, 
Page and Putterman 2006). However, Sally (1995) find that communication through audio-
visual conferences among subjects also increase cooperation significantly.  
Computerized experiments including communication through written messages have become 
more frequently used over the last few decades. Researchers have investigated how anonymous, 
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written messages that removes the presence of facial expressions and voice, affect cooperation, 
compared to face-to-face communication. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) investigate the 
effect of communication through e-mail in a prisoner’s dilemma game. They find that the 
efficiency of cooperation increases significantly when allowing e-mail communication, 
compared to a condition with no communication. Still, the effect is smaller, compared to that 
of face-to-face communication.  
Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006) allow communication through a chat room, in addition to 
a condition with no communication and one with face-to-face communication. Subjects able to 
communicate through a chat room significantly increase their average contributions, compared 
to the baseline with no communication. However, their average contribution is significantly 
lower than that of subjects allowed to communicate face-to-face.  
Following Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006), I allow subjects in the “Communication” 
condition to communicate through a chat room. I investigate whether pre-play communication 
between the two subjects in a potential partnership affects their probability of forming a 
partnership, their contributions and their payoff.  
 
2.2 COOPERATIVE TYPES 
Research shows that peoples’ cooperative dispositions are heterogenous and stable over time. 
Both Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) elicit subjects’ 
type using a variant of the “strategy method”, developed by Selten (1967). The authors in both 
papers distinguish between Conditional Cooperators, Free Riders and Others. Conditional 
Cooperators’ contributions are expected to be positively correlated with their beliefs about other 
individuals’ contribution, whereas Free Riders are characterized as pure selfish. Conditional 
Cooperators are expected to contribute more, on average, compared to Free Riders.  
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Kurzban and Houser (2005) also elicit subjects’ type. They classify them as Reciprocals (i.e. 
Conditional Cooperators), Free Riders and Unconditional Cooperators. Unconditional 
Cooperators are expected to contribute a great deal of their endowments all the time, regardless 
of their beliefs about other individuals’ contribution.  
I follow Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) in eliciting 
subjects’ type using the strategy method. I explore whether different types are affected 
differently by the opportunity to communicate. I also re-elicit individuals’ type at the end of the 
experiment, to investigate whether communication changes the composition of different types 
in my sample.  
 
2.3 WHY DOES COMMUNICATION MATTER? 
The willingness to enter into and honour commitments […] does indeed represent 
something wonderful, mysterious, and fundamental about human nature. The challenge of 
future research is to dispel the mystery. (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliand 1994, 527) 
It seems the ability to communicate shifts peoples’ focus from individual to collective gain. 
Why does this happen? Both Dawes, Van De Kragt and Orbell (1988) and Kerr and Kaufman-
Gilliand (1994) suggest that individuals’ promises or commitments to cooperate leads to higher 
rates of cooperation. The social contract formed through these promises may influence peoples’ 
preferences and create empathy and a sense of group identity, which in turn may alter their 
behaviour (Dawes, Van De Kragt and Orbell 1988; Sally 1995).  
Wilson and Harris (2017) classify words subjects use in a chat room in three topics, including 
recruitment words, scavenging words and substantives. Recruitment words are words that 
subjects use to encourage or persuade each other to cooperate.  Scavenging words include 
words that focus on strategies or tactics, and words that will affect participants’ outcome. 
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Wilson and Harris (2017) also emphasize the function of specific substantives, such as we and 
us, to create a common identity when subjects pursue a common end. If these substantives 
creates a common identity, or a sense of group identity, they may influence peoples’ behaviour.  
Furthermore, communication may influence peoples’ expectations and beliefs about others’ 
behaviour. If the promises or commitments from others to cooperate seem credible, a person 
may alter her behaviour as she wishes to live up to others’ expectations and avoid guilt 
(Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). 
 
Following Wilson and Harris (2017), I classify words subjects use in the chat room in different 
conversation topics. I examine which topics are the most prevalent in the chat room and how 
subjects use words affiliated with the most prevalent topics. Finally, I explore whether different 
cooperative types use each conversation topic more or less frequently than others. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE LAB EXPERIMENT 
 
I will begin this chapter by explaining the main features of the experimental design. I conduct 
a controlled lab experiment consisting of the following three parts, which I will explain in 
detail1. PART I: Type elicitation. PART II: Repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with either 
communication or no communication. PART III: Type re-elicitation. Furthermore, I address the 
experimental procedure in addition to the procedure for classification of cooperative types.  
 
3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
I conduct a two-person repeated prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game to examine the effect of 
communication. The PD game takes place within potential pairs of two subjects, with mutual 
partner choice. If the two potential partners do not mutually choose one another, none of them 
will engage in the game in the current period. If both subjects actively choose one another, they 
will form a partnership in the current period. If so, they will engage in the PD game which 
involves a production decision. This is the only way to earn a payoff in the current period. 
TABLE 1, PANEL A shows the payoff matrix in the PD game for a partnership between subject 
i and j.  
Both subject i and subject j receive ten blue (private good) experimental currency units (ECU) 
each in the PD game. They may choose to keep some number of blue units to themselves, and 
some to produce red (public good) units with the other person. Their decision to contribute to 
the production of the public good is made privately and simultaneously.  
Each blue unit used to produce the public good, is equal to 0.7 red units for subject i and 0.7 
red units for subject j, creating a social dilemma. Total number of red units produced in each 
                                               
1 A detailed overview of the instructions from the lab experiment is provided in Appendix A.  
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period, is given by the sum of i and j’s contributions of blue units, 𝑥" and 𝑥#. Each blue and red 
unit is equal to one point, which is equivalent to one Norwegian kroner. The payoff for subject 
𝑖, 𝜋", in each period is: 
[1]                                               𝜋" = 10 − 𝑥" + 0.7-𝑥" + 𝑥#. 
 
TABLE 1: PARTICIPANTS’ CHOICES. 
PANEL A: PAYOFF MATRIX IN THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME. 
  
COOPERATE (𝒙𝒋 = 𝟏𝟎) 
 
DEVIATE (𝒙𝒋 = 𝟎) 
COOPERATE (𝒙𝒊 = 𝟏𝟎) (14, 14) (7, 17) 
DEVIATE (𝒙𝒊 = 𝟎) (17, 7) (10, 10) 
 





STAY Prisoner’s dilemma game (0,0) 
LEAVE (0,0) (0,0) 
 
TABLE 1, PANEL B shows the strategy matrix when partnership is based on mutual partner 
choice. The dominant strategy in the partners choice is always to STAY within a partnership. 
Furthermore, the dominant strategy is always to contribute zero to the production of the public 
good, and thereby DEVIATE in the PD game (TABLE 1, PANEL A). 
As subjects are placed in potential partnerships, it is likely that the regression model errors are 
correlated within each pair, or cluster. When I analyse the data, I cluster the standard errors on 
partnership level, and assume that the regression model errors are independent across clusters 
(Angrist and Pischke 2014).   
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Note also that if subjects do not successfully form a mutual partnership, they cannot choose to 
contribute to the production of the public good. If so, I cannot observe how much they would 
have contributed, given the opportunity. The contribution variable in my sample is thus affected 
by a selection bias, as I may only observe subjects’ contributions if, and only if, they 
successfully form a mutual partnership. When analysing the results in Chapter 4, I can therefore 
not measure the causal effect of communication on contribution for all participants. I can only 
measure how the opportunity to communicate affects the contributions of those who 
successfully form a partnership. Following Heckman et al. (1998), I provide a more detailed 
explanation of the selection bias in Appendix B. 
 
3.2 PART I 
I elicit each subjects’ type by implementing the strategy method (Selten 1967) as I conduct a 
one-shot PD game, following the design by Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001). In the first 
part of the experiment, the participants make two types of decisions; (1) an unconditional 
contribution, and (2) how much they are willing to contribute conditional on all possible 
contribution choices of another subject’s contribution schedule. The contribution table thus 
utilizes the strategy method and elicits a contribution schedule for each subject in the 
experiment.  
The strategy method is useful when gathering data for empirical analysis on subjects’ 
behaviour, as it provides multiple observations for each participant. Furthermore, it provides 
me with contingent decisions for all possible choices that the subjects might choose, not only 
the ones they choose in the actual game (Brandts and Charness 2011).  FIGURE 1 displays the 
layout for the contribution table2.  
                                               
2 I present four screen-shots from z-Tree in this chapter. English translation of the text in each screen-shot is 
provided in Appendix C.  
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FIGURE 1: CONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION TABLE. 
 
Both types of decisions may affect subjects’ final payoff, which gives them a monetary 
incentive to take them seriously. They are told that a random draw will determine which of the 
two decisions that will affect their final payoff. For one randomly chosen subject, the 
conditional contribution table will be the relevant decision, while the unconditional contribution 
will be the relevant decision for another randomly chosen subject. The two randomly chosen 
subjects who’s decisions are paired together, belong to the same treatment condition. 
Participants are not informed of this payment procedure.  
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3.3 PART II 
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of two treatment conditions in PART II of the experiment, 
either the “Communication” or the “No communication” condition. TABLE 2 displays the main 
features of the experimental design. 





Maximum 12 subjects per  
session, divided in 6 pairs.  
 
A total of 100 subjects,  





Maximum 12 subjects per 
session, divided in 6 pairs. 
 
A total of 98 subjects,  
49 pairs and 9 sessions.   
 
Each subject is placed in a fixed potential partnership with one other subject. They are told that 
they will be given the opportunity to cooperate with the other person throughout this part of the 
experiment, consisting of ten periods. Furthermore, subjects are informed of their personal ID-
number, and their potential partner’s ID-number.  
The two subjects who can form a partnership belong to the same treatment condition, though 
they are not given this information. Depending on their treatment condition, each potential pair 
proceeds to the partner choice with, or without, the opportunity to communicate first. Subjects 
in the “Communication” condition may communicate with their potential partner through a chat 
room in the beginning of each period. Subjects in the “No communication” condition may not 
communicate. The chat room automatically close after 25 seconds. From here on, participants 
in both the “Communication” and the “No communication” condition face the same decisions 
for the rest of the current period. FIGURE 2 displays the layout of the chat room in the 
“Communication” condition.  
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FIGURE 2: CHAT ROOM. 
 
The two subjects in a potential pair, may mutually choose to form a partnership. They make 
their decision simultaneously within ten seconds. Both subjects are informed that if any of them 
abstain from choosing one another, they do not form a mutual partnership. If so, they will both 
be excluded from the following production decision and their payoff in the current period will 
be equal to zero. The default choice is set to the subject’s ID-number itself. To be able to move 
on to the production decision, each of them must actively choose one another. FIGURE 3 
displays the layout of the partner choice.  
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FIGURE 3: THE PARTNER CHOICE. 
 
If the two subjects mutually choose one another, they form a partnership in the current period 
and proceed to the production decision. The production decision is designed as a prisoner’s 
dilemma, and employs the payoff function as defined in equation [1], section 3.1. All 
participants engaging in the production decision, are endowed ten blue units (private good). 
The two subjects in each partnership make their production decision simultaneously within ten 
seconds. FIGURE 4 displays the layout of the production decision.  
FIGURE 4: THE PRODUCTION DECISION. 
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The default is set to zero, so that each subject must actively choose to produce the public good. 
As the production decision automatically ends, each subject is informed of her personal 
inventory of the private and public good from the current period. This marks the end of the 
current period, and the experiment will continue to the next period. When the ten periods are 
completed, PART III of the experiment begins.  
 
3.4 PART III 
To re-elicit subjects’ type, they make the two decisions regarding their unconditional and 
conditional contribution again, identically as in PART I of the experiment. By re-eliciting 
subjects’ type, I may examine whether pre-play communication affects the composition of types 
in my sample.  
Participants are told that they have made the same decision before and that they, despite this, 
are free to make whatever choice they want in these new decisions. They are also informed that 
a random draw will determine which of the two decisions that will affect their final payoff. For 
one randomly chosen subject, the conditional contribution table will be the relevant decision, 
while the unconditional contribution will be the relevant decision for another randomly chosen 
subject. The two randomly chosen participants who’s decisions are paired together, belong to 
different treatment conditions. This matching process ensures that all subjects are matched with 
someone else than any previous match in the experiment. Participants are not informed of this 
payment procedure. 
As PART III of the experiment ends, all participants are asked to answer two questions. First, 
regarding their gender. Second, whether they have participated in economic experiments prior 
to this one.  
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3.5   EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
Pilot experiments executed prior to the main experiment is important to ensure efficiency and 
minimize the chance of unreliable results (Sincero 2012). To make sure that z-Tree worked as 
planned, I executed several private pilots in the lab. Furthermore, I executed one external, 
participatory pilot to ensure that the instructions and information provided to the participants 
were correct, sufficient and efficient.  
Six students were recruited to act as participants in the external, participatory pilot. This means 
that the subjects were informed that they were in a pre-test phase, and encouraged to make 
comments and suggestions regarding the experiment. Each of them contributed with valuable 
feedback regarding both the instructions and the information they were provided during the 
pilot. None of the participants in the external, participatory pilot were included in the main 
experiment. 
The experiment was conducted February 14th, 2018 at the Citizen lab, Sofie Lindstrøms Hus in 
Rosenberg gate 35, at the University of Bergen. Participants were mainly recruited through 
hroot (Bock, Baetge and Nicklisch 2014). The invitation e-mail was sent out one week prior to 
the experiment3. In addition, students at the University of Bergen and at the Norwegian School 
of Economics could sign up through internal web pages. All participants were informed, both 
in the invitation e-mail and through the internal web pages, that they would receive 50 NOK as 
a show up fee.  
All nine sessions were conducted on the same day, starting at 8.20 am. and lasting until the 
ninth session ended at 5 pm. A total of 198 students participated in the experiment, 100 in the 
“Communication” condition and 98 in the “No communication” condition. 18-24 subjects 
                                               
3 Details about the invitation e-mail is provided in Appendix D. 
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participated in each session. I used the program z-Tree 3.6.7 (Fischbacher 2007) to conduct the 
experiment. 
Participants were randomized between the two treatment conditions within each session. Upon 
arrival, subjects were greeted by a lab assistant as they drew an identity tag from an urn on their 
way into the lab. They took a seat at any available computer, separated by partition walls. Each 
computer corresponded to either the “Communication” or the “No communication” condition. 
Subjects were not given this information.  
In addition to the lab assistant, three experimenters conducted the experiment. As the 
experiment started, subjects were asked by one of the experimenters not to speak with each 
other, raise their hand if they had any questions and that they could withdraw for the experiment 
at any time. The same experimenter was available to enter the lab during the experiment if there 
were any questions. All other information was provided to the participants on the computer. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects reported the letter on their identity tag (ranging from A 
to X) in a questionnaire. This allowed the two experimenters, seated in a separate control room 
during the entire experiment, to link each subject to their earnings as they prepared the 
payments.  
Envelopes with participants’ earnings were finalized and sealed by the two experimenters in 
the control room. All envelopes were marked with a letter corresponding to a subject’s identity 
tag and handed to the experimenter in the lab. She handed them out to the subjects in exchange 
for their identity tag as they left the lab. The payment procedure ensured that none of the 
experimenters knew the amount each participant received, thereby ensuring the double 
blindness condition.  
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Each session lasted for approximately 35 minutes. On average, each participant earned 163 
NOK (21.35 USD) in total. This equals an average hourly payment of 279 NOK (36.55 USD), 
well above average hourly wage for an undergraduate student in Norway. 
 
3.6 CLASSIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE TYPES 
All subjects made their conditional contribution choices both in PART I and PART III of the 
experiment. They chose the amount of their private good they would contribute, ranging from 
zero to ten ECU, conditional on another person’s contribution of their private good. I use subject 
𝑖’s eleven conditional contributions choices, denoted as 𝑦"6, 𝑘 = 0, 1, 2…10, to classify her 
cooperative type from the elicitation in PART I and the re-elicitation in PART III of the 
experiment.  
I follow the classification procedure of Kurzban and Houser (2005), and elicit 𝑖’s cooperative 
type based on her Ordinary Least Square estimated contribution profile (LCP). Equation [2] 
defines the LCP. The constant captures subject 𝑖’s unconditional contribution, the slope 
measures her response to the partner’s contribution and 𝑢"6 is the error term.  
[2]                                                     𝑦"6 = 	  𝛼" + 𝛽"𝑦6 + 𝑢"6 
By creating cut-off values for subjects’ estimated contribution profile, I classify each participant 
as a Cooperator, Free Rider or Others. Cooperators show a willingness to cooperate. Their 
LCP’s are either always above 75 % of the endowment, as an Unconditional Cooperator4, or 
within a band of 25 % of the endowment along the 45-degree line, as a Conditional Cooperator5. 
However, if a subject’s LCP always lies below 25 % of the total endowment, she is classified 
                                               
4 Predicted contributions 𝑦?"6 ≥ 7.5 for all 𝑘 (Unconditional Cooperator: 4.04 % in PART I, 4.55 % in PART III). 
5 Predicted contributions −2.5 + 𝑘 ≤ 𝑦?"6 ≥ 2.5 + 𝑘 for all 𝑘 (Conditional Cooperator: 40.91 % in both PART I 
and PART III). 
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as a Free Rider6. Participants who do not follow any of the specified contribution profiles, are 
classified as Others.  
TABLE 3 shows the distribution of cooperative types classified from the elicitation in PART I 
and the re-elicitation in PART III of the experiment. The overall composition of types classified 
from both the elicitation and the re-elicitation is nearly identical. 
TABLE 3: CLASSIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE TYPES. 
Type PART I PART III 
Cooperator 89 (45, 44), 45 % 90 (46, 44), 45 % 
Free Rider 35 (13, 22), 18 % 33 (15, 18), 17 % 
Others 74 (40, 34), 37 % 75 (37, 38), 38 % 
N 198 198 
Note: PART I shows the number of subjects in the sample classified as each type from the elicitation. PART III 
shows the number of subjects in the sample classified as each type from the re-elicitation. Number of subjects in 
each treatment condition in parentheses (“No communication”, “Communication”).  
The distribution of cooperative types in my experiment is fairly similar to findings from related 
literature. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) find that 50 % of the subjects in their sample 
may be classified as Conditional Cooperators and 30 % are classified as Free Riders. 55 % of 
the subjects in the sample of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) are classified as Conditional 
Cooperators, and 23 % are classified as Free Riders. Kurzban and Houser (2005) classify 63 % 
of the subjects in their sample as Reciprocals (i.e. Conditional Cooperators), 20 % as Free 
Riders and 13 % as Unconditional Cooperators. 
                                               
6 Predicted contributions 𝑦?"6 ≤ 2.5 for all 𝑘. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
4.1   EFFECTS OF PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATION  
RESULT 1: Pre-play communication does not significantly increase the overall probability 
of forming a partnership. 
The two potential partners form a partnership in the current period if they mutually choose one 
another. If not, they are both excluded from the current period. Results indicate that the overall 
estimated probability of forming a partnership is nearly identical in both treatment conditions. 
Subjects in the “Communication” condition face a 4.50 percentage points (p=0.338) higher 
probability of successfully form a mutual partnership, compared to subjects in the “No 
communication” condition (column 1, TABLE 4).  
TABLE 4: OLS REGRESSIONS. ESTIMATED EFFECT OF PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATION ON 
SUBJECTS’ PROBABILITY OF FORMING A PARTNERSHIP. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All periods All periods Periods 1 – 5  Periods 6 – 10  
Communication 0.0450 0.0843 0.0506 0.0230 
 (0.0468) (0.0697) (0.0577) (0.0543) 
     
Period  0.0866***   
  (0.00656)   
     
Communication x Period  -0.00864   
  (0.00948)   
     
Female  -0.0608 -0.0968** -0.0248 
  (0.0393) (0.0442) (0.0449) 
     
Participate  0.0137 0.00827 0.0191 
  (0.0289) (0.0394) (0.0321) 
     
Constant 0.649*** 0.208*** 0.514*** 0.855*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0578) (0.0577) (0.0605) 
N 1980 1980 990 990 
adj. R2 0.002 0.258 0.009 0.000 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 99 groups) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Participate indicates whether an individual has participated in an economic experiment prior to my experiment. 
(1)   Overall estimation results, with no controls.  
(2)   Estimation results, with controls. 
(3)   Estimation results in periods 1 – 5, with controls. 
(4)   Estimation results in periods 6 – 10, with controls.  
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Overall, participants successfully form a mutual partnership 64.9 % of the time in the “No 
communication” condition, and 69.4 % of the time in the “Communication” condition, on 
average. This equals a 6.9 % difference in average partnership formation between the two 
treatment conditions.  
Subjects in the “Communication” condition are 5.06 percentage points (p=0.383) more likely 
to successfully form a mutual partnership in periods 1 – 5, compared to subjects in the “No 
communication” condition in the same five periods (column 3, TABLE 4). Furthermore, in 
periods 6 – 10, participants who may communicate are 2.30 percentage points (p=0.672) more 
likely to form a mutual partnership, compared to participants in the same five periods who may 
not communicate (column 4, TABLE 4).  
Communication does not seem to significantly affect the probability of successfully forming a 
mutual partnership, overall. Subjects in both the “No communication” and the 
“Communication” condition seem to follow a similar, increasing likelihood of successfully 
forming a partnership throughout the game.  
 
RESULT 2: Subjects contribute significantly more in the “Communication” condition, 
compared to the “No communication” condition, given that they successfully form mutual 
partnerships. The difference increases over periods.  
Results indicate that subjects who successfully form a partnership in the “Communication” 
condition contribute 12.79 percentage points (p<0.1) more, overall, compared to those who 
form partnerships in the “No communication” condition (see column 1, TABLE E1, Appendix 
E). This equals a 21.11 % difference in overall average contributions between the two treatment 
conditions. Thus, in line with findings of Isaac and Walker (1988) and Bochet, Page and 
Putterman (2006), subjects make higher contributions when they may communicate. 
 22 
Furthermore, results indicate that participants who successfully form partnerships in periods 1 
– 5, make nearly identical contributions in both treatment conditions7. However, the difference 
in estimated contributions between the two treatment conditions increase throughout the game. 
Subjects who successfully form mutual partnerships in periods 6 – 10, are estimated to 
contribute 15.90 percentage points (p<0.01) more in the “Communication” condition, 
compared to the “No communication” condition (column 4, TABLE E1, Appendix E).  
FIGURE 5, PANEL A illustrates participants’ average contribution in each period, by treatment 
condition. When no communication is allowed, subjects’ average contribution decreases as of 
period 5. Subjects in the “Communication” condition stabilize their average contribution on 
approximately 73 % of their endowment as of period 2, and throughout the rest of the game.  
FIGURE 5, PANEL B illustrates how communication is estimated to affect participants’ 
contribution, compared to participants in the “No communication” condition, by period. 
Subjects in the “Communication” condition is estimated to make significantly higher 
contributions than subjects in the “No communication” condition in period six, eight, nine and 
ten.  
Recall that different cooperative types are expected to contribute differently (Fischbacher, 
Gächter and Fehr 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). If types who typically contribute more, 
are more likely to form partnerships when they can communicate, compared to a situation where 
they cannot not, this could offer an explanation to my result. I will investigate the effect of 
communication on Cooperators’ and Free Riders’ probability of forming a mutual partnership 
in section 4.2, Result 4.  
                                               
7 In periods 1 – 5, subjects are estimated to contribute 0.0401 percentage points (p=0.993) more in the 
“Communication” condition, compared to the “No communication” condition (see column 3, TABLE E1, 
Appendix E). 
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FIGURE 5: AVERAGE AND ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTIONS. 
PANEL A: AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION (%), BY PERIOD AND TREATMENT CONDITION. 
 
Note: Figure 5, Panel A shows subjects’ average contribution in the “No communication” and the 
“Communication” condition, by period.  
 
PANEL B: ESTIMATED DIFFERENCE IN CONTRIBUTIONS BETWEEN TREATMENTS, WITH 95 % CIS. 
 
Note: Figure 5, Panel B is based on results from an OLS regression estimating the difference in average 
contributions between the “Communication” and the “No communication” condition, by period, for subjects who 
successfully for mutual partnerships. The OLS regression does not include any controls and standard errors are 
clustered on partnership level. The gap between the solid and the dotted line, illustrates the marginal difference 
(percentage points) in average contributions in the “Communication” condition, compared to the “No 
communication” condition. 
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RESULT 3: Pre-play communication does not significantly increase subjects’ overall 
individual payoff. 
Payoff is defined as the number of ECUs each subject earns in one period, including the amount 
she keeps as a private good and the sum of own and partner’s contribution to the public good. 
Payoff is equal to zero if participants do not form a mutual partnership. The economically 
efficient outcome, is when each subject earns 14 ECU8. This is the maximum efficient 
individual payoff.  
Results do not indicate that subjects in the “Communication” condition earn a significantly 
higher average payoff, compared to subjects in the “No communication” condition. Participants 
who may communicate, is estimated to earn 6.53 percentage points (p=0.152) more, overall, 
compared to participants in the “No communication” condition (see column 1, TABLE E2, 
Appendix E). This equals a 11.41 % higher average payoff for subjects in the “Communication” 
condition, compared to the “No communication” condition, overall. Thus, communication does 
not seem to improve the group optimality significantly9. 
FIGURE 6 illustrates subjects’ average payoff in each of the ten periods, by treatment condition. 
Participants in both the “Communication” and “No communication” condition, increase their 
average payoff throughout the game. Furthermore, the estimated effect of communication on 
subjects’ payoff seem to be evenly distributed across the ten periods of the game. Subjects able 
to communicate, are estimated to earn a somewhat higher payoff in both the first five and last 
five periods of the game, compared to subjects in the “No communication” condition10.  
                                               
8 The values of my payoff variable ranges from 0 to 17. I re-scale the payoff variable so that subjects’ payoff 
may be expressed as the percentage of the maximum economically efficient individual payoff, 14. The formula 
is as follows:  CDEFGG
HI
∗ 100 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚	  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓. 
9 My results do not match those of Isaac and Walker (1988), who find that communication improves group 
optimality significantly.  
10 Subjects in the “Communication” condition are estimated to earn 4.95 percentage points (p=0.361) more in 
periods 1 – 5, compared to subjects in the “No communication” condition in the same five periods. In periods 6 – 
10, subjects in the “Communication” condition is estimated to earn 6.19 percentage points (p=0.232) more, 
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FIGURE 6: AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL PAYOFF (%), BY PERIOD AND TREATMENT CONDITION. 
 
Note: The figure shows subjects’ average payoff in the “Communication” and the “No communication” condition, 
by period. The average payoff is illustrated as the percentage of maximum efficient individual payoff. 
 
4.2   COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATIVE TYPES 
I use the cooperative types, classified from the elicitation in PART I of the experiment, to both 
estimate and compare how pre-play communication affects Cooperators and Free Riders. 
RESULT 4: Free Riders significantly increase their probability of forming a partnership in 
the “Communication” condition, compared to Free Riders the “No communication” condition.  
A Free Rider is 16.3 percentage points (p<0.1) more likely to successfully form a mutual 
partnership in the “Communication” condition, compared to the “No communication” 
condition (see column 2, TABLE E3, Appendix E). FIGURE 7 (B) illustrates the percentage of 
formed mutual partnerships in each condition for Free Riders. A Free Rider successfully forms 
                                               
compared to those in the “No communication” condition. See results from OLS regressions in column 3 and 4, 
TABLE E2, Appendix E.  
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a mutual partnership 54.6 % of the time in the “No communication” condition, and 70.9 % of 
the time in the “Communication” condition. This equals a 29.9 % difference between the two 
treatment conditions. 
FIGURE 7: % OF SUCCESSFULLY FORMED MUTUAL PARTNERSHIPS, BY TYPE AND 
TREATMENT CONDITION. 
 
Note: The figure is based on average successful partnership formation for each cooperative type in the 
“Communication” and the “No communication” condition. 
Surprisingly, Cooperators do not seem to experience a similar effect of communication on their 
likelihood of forming a mutual partnership, as Free Riders do. Results indicate that a Cooperator 
in the “Communication” condition is 1.04 percentage points (p=0.878) more likely to 
successfully form a mutual partnership, compared to a Cooperator in the “No communication” 
condition (see column 1, TABLE E3, Appendix E). This equals a 1.6 % difference, overall, as 
Cooperators in the “No communication” and “Communication” conditions form mutual 
partnerships 65.6 % and 66.6 % of the time, respectively (see FIGURE 7 (A)). Thus, 
Cooperators’ probability of successfully forming a mutual partnership is nearly identical in both 
treatment conditions. 
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Furthermore, I examine if the effect of pre-play communication affects Free Riders’ estimated 
probability of forming a partnership differently than that of Cooperators. Compared with the 
“No communication” condition, Free Riders in the “Communication” condition increase their 
estimated probability of forming a mutual partnership by 15.3 percentage points (p=0.130) 
more than Cooperators do in the “Communication” condition (see column 2, TABLE E3, 
Appendix E). 
My results might seem surprising, as related literature suggests that Cooperators are preferred 
as partners when one may choose a partner (Frank 1987). However, as participants have to form 
mutual partnerships to earn money, it creates incentives for the Free Rider to mimic a 
Cooperator’s behaviour in the chat room. If they do so, this might offer an explanation for my 
results.   
 
RESULT 5: Cooperators contribute significantly more  in the “Communication” condition, 
compared to Cooperators in the “No communication” condition.  
Results from column 1, TABLE 5 indicate that a Cooperator in the “Communication” condition 
is estimated contribute 13.37 percentage points (p<0.05) more, compared to a Cooperator in the 
“No communication” condition. This equals a 19.5 % difference between the two treatment 
conditions, overall. A Cooperator contributes 68.61 % of her endowed units in the “No 
communication” condition, compared to 81.98 % in the “Communication” condition, on 
average.  
Free Riders also contribute more when they are able to communicate with their potential 
partner, compared to when they are not, on average. However, the difference is not significant. 
A Free Rider in the “Communication” condition is estimated to contribute 14.42 percentage 
points (p=0.159) more overall, compared to a Free Rider in the “No communication” condition 
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(column 2, TABLE 5). This is equal to a 34.8 % difference in estimated contributions between 
Free Riders in the two treatment conditions. 







“No communication” 68.61 41.41 56.85 
“Communication” 81.98 55.83 74.24 
Estimated treatment effect 13.37** 14.42 17.39*** 
Note: The estimations in TABLE 5 corresponds with the OLS regressions in TABLE E4, Appendix E with no 
controls and standard errors clustered on partnership level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Results indicate that a Free Rider in the “Communication” condition increases her estimated 
contribution by 1.056 percentage points (p=0.928) more than a Cooperator in the 
“Communication” condition, compared to their respective estimated contributions in the “No 
communication” condition (column 2, TABLE E4, Appendix E).  
 
RESULT 6: Free Riders significantly increase their individual payoff in the 
“Communication” condition, compared to Free Riders in  the “No communication” condition.  
A Free Rider’s estimated average payoff is 15.35 percentage points (p<0.1) higher in the 
“Communication” condition, compared to a Free Rider in the “No communication” condition 
(see column 2, TABLE E5, Appendix E). She thereby increases her average payoff by 30.8 %, 
from 49.82 % of her efficient individual payoff in the “No communication” condition, to 65.17 
% in the “Communication” condition. This is illustrated in FIGURE 8.  
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FIGURE 8: OVERALL AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL PAYOFF (%), BY TYPE AND TREATMENT 
CONDITION. 
 
Note: The figure shows the average payoff for each type in the “Communication” and the “No communication”  
condition. The average payoff is illustrated as the percentage of maximum efficient individual payoff, equal to 14 
ECU. 
FIGURE 8 also illustrates a Cooperator’s average payoff in the “Communication” and the “No 
communication” condition. She is estimated to earn 1.75 percentage points (p=0.798) more in 
the “Communication” condition, compared to a Cooperator in the “No communication” 
condition (see column 1, TABLE E5, Appendix E). This equals to a 3 % increase in average 
individual payoff.  
Furthermore, I examine if the effect of pre-play communication affects Free Riders’ estimated 
probability of forming a partnership differently than that of Cooperators. A Free Rider in the 
“Communication” condition is estimated to increase her average payoff by 13.59 percentage 
points (p=186) more than a Cooperator in the “Communication” condition, compared to their 
respective estimated payoff in the “No communication” condition  (column 2, TABLE E5, 
Appendix E).  
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Recall that a Cooperator in the “Communication” condition is estimated to contribute 
significantly more, compared to a Cooperator in the “No communication” condition. However, 
her average payoff in the “Communication” condition does not seem to increase significantly, 
compared to the payoff of a Cooperator in the “No communication” condition. Thus, a 
Cooperator in the “Communication” condition does not gain from contributing more, compared 




CHAPTER 5: HOW DO PARTNERS COMMUNICATE?  
 
Recall, from the introduction in Chapter 1, one of the key issues motivating this thesis. I wish 
to explore how individuals use language to affect each other’s behaviour. So, how may we 
explain why communication seems to positively affect contributions, overall? More 
specifically, why do Cooperators significantly increase their contributions when they may 
communicate? Finally, why are Free Riders the ones that end up earning more and are more 
likely to successfully form mutual partnerships, compared to Free Riders who may not 
communicate?  
I study the language potential partners use in the chat room to explore if the way they 
communicate may explain these results. First, I do a quantitative text analysis to get an overview 
of the most prevalent conversation topics in the chat room. Second, I explore the language 
further, by doing a qualitative text analysis in section 5.2.  
 
5.1 CONVERSATION TOPICS 
I choose to do the quantitative text analysis in STATA to create a “bag-of-words” representation 
of free-form text (Williams 2015) 11. However, the method provides me with a large number of 
“bags”, too many to present the content of the chat in a meaningful way. I therefore manually 
classify the most interesting “bags” in six topics.  
I base the affiliation of each “bag” to their respective topic on their context in the chat, and on 
conversation topics presented in related literature (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006; Wilson and 
Harris 2017). The six topics I have chosen, are listed below. The list includes all “bags-of-
                                               
11 I use the txttool command in STATA for the quantitative text analysis.  
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words” affiliated to each topic. Norwegian translation of each bag-of-word is provided in 
Appendix F.  
TOPIC 1: SINGULAR PRONOUNS. 
I, you, me, your, yours, my, mine.  
TOPIC 2: PLURAL PRONOUNS. 
We, us, our. 
TOPIC 3: COMMITMENT AND RECRUITMENT. 
Both, together, promise, pinkey, 10, ten, give, giving, much, more, most, increase, contribute, go, best, 
agree, fair, share, cooperate, betray, full, jackpot, choose, good, fine, nice, excellent, wonderful, superb, 
perfect, sweet, happy, cool.  
TOPIC 4: EARNINGS AND TACTICS. 
Earn, profit, count, maximize, largest, bet, gain, payoff, money, invest, points, plan, tactic, suggest, 
suggestion, alert, produce, production, blue, red, deal, formula, agreement, negotiate.  
TOPIC 5: CONFUSED. 
Confused, misunderstand, understand, realize(d).  
TOPIC 6: REGRET AND EMOTIONS. 
Forgiven, sorry, wrong, failed, loosing, feel, fair, cowardice.  
Any written message in the chat may be characterized as an entry, no matter if it is only one 
word or number, or if it is a full sentence. There is a total of 1529 entries in the chat. Each entry 
is made by a subject whose type I have elicited in PART I of the experiment. There are 44 
Cooperators who made a total of 577 entries, 22 Free Riders who made a total of 407 entries 
and 34 subjects classified as Others who made a total of 545 entries in the chat. Thus, Free 
Riders are the ones that make entries in the chat room most frequently, overall12. 
TABLE 6 shows the number of entries that include a word affiliated to each topic in different 
parts of the game, overall and by each cooperative type. Average number of entries per subject 
is listed in parentheses.  
TABLE 6 also shows which of the defined conversation topics that are the most prevalent in the 
chat. Subjects seem to use the chat room mostly to convey commitments and recruitment words 
                                               
12 On average, a Free Rider makes approximately 19 entries in the chat room throughout the game. A Cooperator 
makes 13 and Others make 16 entries, on average.  
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(TOPIC 3). Other topics that frequently occur in the chat room are pronouns, both singular 
(TOPIC 1) and plural (TOPIC 2), as well as earnings and tactics (TOPIC 4). I will refer to these 
four topics as the overall prevalent topics.  

















TOPIC 1 All periods: 172 (1.72) 55 (1.25) 61(2.77) 56 (1.65) 
 Period 1-5: 83 (0.83) 23 (0.52) 26 (1.18) 34 (1.00) 
 Period 6-10: 89 (0.89) 32 (0.73) 35 (1.59) 22 (0.65) 
TOPIC 2 All periods: 71 (0.71) 32 (0.73) 16 (0.73) 23 (0.68) 
 Period 1-5: 47 (0.47) 18 (0.41) 12 (0.55) 17 (0.50) 
 Period 6-10: 24 (0.24) 14 (0.32) 4 (0.18) 6 (0.18) 
TOPIC 3 All periods: 365 (3.65) 162 (3.68) 69 (3.14) 134 (3.94) 
 Period 1-5: 197 (1.97) 84 (1.91) 42 (1.91) 71 (2.09) 
 Period 6-10: 168 (1.68) 78 (1.77) 27 (1.23) 63 (1.85) 
TOPIC 4 All periods: 114 (1.14) 47 (1.07) 24 (1.09) 43 (1.26) 
 Period 1-5: 70 (0.70) 23 (0.52) 14 (0.64) 33 (0.97) 
 Period 6-10: 44 (0.44) 24 (0.55) 10 (0.45) 10 (0.29) 
TOPIC 5 All periods: 18 (0.18) 7 (0.16) 7 (0.32) 4 (0.12) 
 Period 1-5: 11 (0.11) 4 (0.09) 3 (0.14) 4 (0.12) 
 Period 6-10: 7 (0.07) 3 (0.07) 4 (0.18) 0 (0.00) 
TOPIC 6 All periods: 19 (0.19) 5 (0.11) 3 (0.14) 11 (0.32) 
 Period 1-5: 11 (0.11) 2 (0.05) 2 (0.09) 7 (0.21) 
 Period 6-10: 8 (0.08) 3 (0.07) 1 (0.05) 4 (0.12) 
Note: TOPIC 1: Singular Pronouns, TOPIC 2: Plural Pronouns, TOPIC 3: Commitment and recruitment, TOPIC 4: 
Earnings and tactics, TOPIC 5: Confused, TOPIC 6: Regret and emotions. 
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5.2 THE QUALITATIVE TEXT ANALYSIS 
I explore how subjects use language to affect each other’s behaviour by investigating the 
conversations more thoroughly. A qualitative analysis of the content of participants’ 
conversations may provide some understanding of their behaviour, and thus my results 
presented in Chapter 4. I study the conversations in detail, focusing on the four overall prevalent 
topics in the chat room.  
Example entries from the chat transcripts, representing conversations concerning each of the 
four overall prevalent topics, are presented below13. The example entries are from random 
sessions and periods throughout the whole game. I will use these examples to further illustrate 
how subjects use the chat room.  
I also consider the difference in number of entries per subject affiliated with each of the 
prevalent topics for Cooperators and Free Riders. The example entries presented below are 
written in different fonts, each determined by the senders’ cooperative type (Cooperator, 
Free Rider and Others). 
 
TOPIC 1: SINGULAR PRONOUNS 
Entries affiliated with TOPIC 1 are typically instructions, questions about their potential 
partner’s future choices and conditional or unconditional information about their own future 
choices. Subjects explicitly separate between their own and their potential partner’s decisions, 
as they use words such as me, I and you. 
 
                                               
13 The original example entries in Norwegian is provided in Appendix G.  
 
 35 
Session 2, period 3 
224: You have to choose me.  
Session 3, period 1 
323: I choose 10 in the first period, if you  
              choose something else it means 
              I cannot trust you :)  
Session 3, period 5 
330: But you have to choose me 
329: Yes 
Session 4: period 5 
421: How much do you use for 
      production? I always choose 
      10, don’t know if that  
      matters to you  
Session 4, period 3 
427: How many do you take? 
428: 6 
427: I’ll take 7 if you choose me 
428: Okay 
Period 10 
427: How many do you take? 
428: I’ll take 2 
427: 3 
428: What about you? 
428: Okay 
Session 5, period 8 
523: I through in my small blue  
Note: Each entry is made by a Cooperator, Free Rider or Others. 
We know, from column 2 and 3, TABLE 6 that Free Riders make entries affiliated with TOPIC 
1 more often, compared to Cooperators, when considering all periods of the game. This is also 
true in the first five and last five periods of the game.  
Recall that Free Riders in the “Communication” condition seem to be more likely to 
successfully form partnerships and they are estimated to significantly increase their payoff, 
compared to Free Riders in the “No communication” condition. This is not the case for 
Cooperators. As Free Rides use singular pronouns more often, compared to Cooperators, I 
wonder if this might be an effective strategy to persuade others to cooperate. If so, it would 
contradict the results of Wilson and Harris (2017). They find that participants rely extensively 
on words that seem more unifying (such as we and us) to persuade one another to cooperate, 
compared to words affiliated with my defined TOPIC 1.  
 
TOPIC 2: PLURAL PRONOUNS 
Subjects who make entries affiliated with TOPIC 2 mostly expresses a desire to reach an 
agreement regarding a common strategy with their potential partner. By using words such as 
we and our, a participant includes the other person in the decision, in contrast with many of the 
entries affiliated with TOPIC 1. These kind of words may create a common identity between the 
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two subjects, which again is associated with higher levels of cooperation (Dawes, Van De Kragt 
and Orbell 1988; Wilson and Harris 2017). As participants have to mutually choose one another 
to be able to earn money, it seems beneficiary to promote intentions of cooperation by referring 
to themselves and their potential partner as a common unit.  
 
Session 1, period 1 
121: Do we agree that we go all in?  
      It will result in the greatest payoff  
122: Yes 
Session 1, period 2 
123: Okay! Do we choose each other then? 
124: Yes 
Session 1, period 1 
130: What do we choose? 
129: Give 10 kr together in 10 rounds? 
Session 3, period 3 
323: We choose each other each round, 10  




323:       We choose each other for the rest of  
              the rounds? 
323: 10 each round? 
324: Yes 
Session 3, period 4 




Session 3, period 6 
330: Nice, we continue like this? 
329: Yes 
330: :D 
Session 5, period 2 
532: Give 10 each? Maximize each of our  
             profit + fair  
532: Cool? 
531: Okay 
Session 6,  period 1 
627: Hey, think the smartest thing is 
             if we choose each other  
Session 7, period 1 
729: We earn the most if both of us 
      go all in, full production  
Note: Each entry is made by a Cooperator, Free Rider or Others. 
Entries including plural pronouns are equally made by Cooperators and Free Riders, when 
considering all periods of the game (column 2 and 3, TABLE 6). This makes it somewhat 
difficult to distinguish whether this is an effective strategy to increase cooperation.  
However, Free Riders make entries affiliated with TOPIC 2 somewhat more often in periods 1 
– 5, compared to Cooperators in the same five periods. They might use this kind of language to 
mimic cooperative intents in the first half of the game because they will gain from cooperation 
(Frank 1987; Page, Putterman and Unel 2005). In the last five periods of the game, Cooperators 
make entries affiliated with TOPIC 2 more often, compared to Free Riders in the same periods. 
Thus, Cooperators seem more keen to maintain a common identity with the other subject all the 
way to the end of the game. 
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TOPIC 3: COMMITMENT AND RECRUITMENT 
TOPIC 3 is the most prevalent of all conversation topics, overall. Entries affiliated with TOPIC 
3 express commitments to cooperate as well as explicit wishes to recruit a partner and to 
cooperate in the production stage, usually by contributing the entire endowment. In addition to 
commitments and recruitment words, entries affiliated with TOPIC 3 also include a lot of 
positive words such as nice, superb and emoticons made of punctuations expressing smiles and 
even hearts. I interoperate the conversations as encouraging and positive. 
 
Session 1, period 2 
124: 10 each! 
124: Go 
123: Okay! But do we choose each other then? 
124: Yes 
Period 10 
124: Don’t let me down! 
123: Will never let you down <3 <3 <3 
124: 10 
123: At least not on Valentines 
124: Pliz 
Session 2, period 3 
230: Nice! 
229: Continue like this 10? 
230: Continue like this? 
229: Yes 
229: Easy 
230: Wonderful ;) 
Period 4 
230: Boom 
229: Keep it on 10!! 
230: Cracking the system 
229: Hahaha 
Period 5 
229: Hell yeah 
230: And if one of us chickens out just a little, we  
              have the right not to contribute?  
230: Okay? :P 
Session 3, period 1 




327: This is fine 
328: Good, this is working out fine:) 
327: :) 
328: 10 again then? 
327: Yes 
Period 9 
328: Same? :) 
327: Yeah :) 
328: Superb :) 
327: Nice :) 
Period 10 
327: Feel that we make a good team 
328: Yes :) 
327: :) 
328: One last time now :) 
327: Yes 
Session 3, period 1 
332: 10 each, then we both get 14 
      points? :) 
331: Should we go all in? 
332: Yess 
332: Let's do it :D 
Session 8, period 3 
828: Hi, I have a lot of points, cooperate  
             with me :)  
827: I have 4 
827: Should we cooperate? 
Period 4 
828: Hi, I have 5 blue and four red 
827: Have 3 blue and 10 red 
828: Cooperate? 
827: Cooperation is best 
828: Oh yes! 
 
Note: Each entry is made by a Cooperator, Free Rider or Others. 
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Wilson and Harris (2017) find that the groups that cooperate most efficiently in their 
experiment, are also the ones that use the most recruitment words, such as together, in the chat 
room. I explore whether the cooperative type that expresses the most commitments and 
recruitment words in the chat, benefit in the same way in my experiment.  
Cooperators make entries including commitments and recruitment words more often, compared 
to Free Riders, overall (column 2 and 3, TABLE 6). The two cooperative types seem to make 
the same number of entries per subject affiliated with TOPIC 3 in periods 1 – 5. In periods 6 – 
10, the number of entries per subject decays for both cooperative types. However, Cooperators 
maintain a higher number of entries per subject affiliated with TOPIC 3 in periods 6 – 10, 
compared to Free Riders in the same periods of the game.  
Furthermore, we may consider each type’s use of commitments and recruitment words in the 
chat room in light of the results from section 4.2. Cooperators express commitments and wishes 
to cooperate more often, compared to Free Riders. Still, Cooperators do not seem to achieve 
significantly higher levels of successful partnership formation or payoff, compared to 
Cooperators in the “No communication” condition. However, they do seem to contribute more 
themselves, when able to communicate. The opportunity to express these commitments and 
recruitment words in a chat room, may affect their own behaviour and lead to higher levels of 
contributions.   
 
TOPIC 4: EARNINGS OR TACTICS 
Entries affiliated with TOPIC 4 express a desire to reach an agreement and to cooperate, as those 
affiliated with TOPIC 2 and TOPIC 3, but they do not necessarily use the same kind of language. 
Entries affiliated with TOPIC 4 suggests that the participants are focused on agreeing on a plan 
or a tactic that maximize their expected payoff, rather than cooperation being the goal in itself.  
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Note: Each entry is made by a Cooperator, Free Rider or Others. 
Free Riders seem to make entries affiliated with TOPIC 4 somewhat more often than 
Cooperators, overall (column 2 and 3, TABLE 6). Recall that Free Riders significantly increase 
their payoff when able to communicate, compared to when they may not. Entries regarding 
earnings and tactics may be a useful strategy to encourage contributions by others, and thus 
increase one’s own earnings.  
Furthermore, Free Riders make entries including words associated with earnings and tactics 
more often in periods 1 – 5, compared to Cooperators in the same periods (column 2 and 3, 
TABLE 6). Thus, Free Riders seem keen to make agreements and earn money early on in the 
game. In periods 6 – 10, however, Cooperators make entries affiliated with TOPIC 4 more often, 
compared to Free Riders in the same periods.  
Session 2, period 1 
225: Hi, we are betting max? 
226: 5? 
225: 10! 
Session 3, period 2 
332: Max points? 10 each? 
331: Sounds good 
Period 5 
331: We do 10 again 12? 
332: Should we just continue like this all 
             the way maybe?  
332: Yes 
331: (y) 
Session 7, period 1 
729: We earn the most if we both go 
      full production  
729: Are you in? 
730: Yes 
Period 8:  
729: Do you have a plan? 
730: Eeh no 
729: Should we do 5? 
730: Yes 






821: How many points? 
822: 8? 
821: Deal 
Session 8, period 6 
823: Suggestions on a new tactic? 
823: Both do 10? 
824: If we were to give 10 each  
      every time, we would  
      obviously get the most  
823: Or both do a little less  
Session 8, period 1 
825: High production? 
825: Tarzan 
825: Hahhaha 
826: High   
Period 6 
825: Do we go hard again? 
825: I am pro 
826: Yes 
825: All in 
826: That is how both of us get the most  
             without fucking the other one  
Session 8, period 1 
828: I suggest that we both choose to use 10  
             every other time, I think that is how  
             we get the most points together  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The experimental literature commonly invokes that (i) communication enhances cooperative 
behaviour in social dilemmas and that (ii) subjects’ cooperative dispositions are heterogenous. 
This thesis uses the experimental method to investigate how chat room communication affects 
individuals’ behaviour in a social dilemma. More importantly, I combine (i) and (ii) by 
investigating whether communication affects the probability of forming partnerships, the 
contributions and the payoff of individuals with different cooperative dispositions differently. I 
also explore the language potential partners use in the chat room. 
Results show that communication does not affect subjects’ overall probability of forming a 
mutual partnership or their overall payoff. As participants in my experiment do not face a 
complex coordination problem involving many participants, this might explain why 
communication does not significantly improve in the efficiency, overall, as the literature would 
suggest (Wilson and Harris 2017; Bochet, Page and Putterman 2006). However, subjects who 
do engage in the production by mutually choosing one another, significantly increase their 
overall contributions when they may communicate, compared to those who cannot 
communicate.  
Complementing the results of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001), Kurzban and Houser 
(2005) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), I find that subjects display heterogenous 
cooperative dispositions. My results add to the experimental literature on communication by 
showing that when no communication is possible, it pays to be willing to cooperate, as 
Cooperators perform better than Free Riders. They are more likely to form mutual partnerships 
and they earn a higher payoff, compared to Free Riders. Cooperators also contribute more to 
the production of the public good than Free Riders do. Thus, when two people rely on a mutual 
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agreement to work together and when their actions are the only form of expression, it pays to 
be willing to cooperate. 
However, when subjects may communicate, and express themselves through language as well 
as actions, Free Riders end up being the winners. They are more likely to successfully form 
mutual partnerships, compared to Cooperators. Furthermore, Cooperators increase their 
contributions even more when they may communicate, compared to Cooperators who cannot. 
Free Riders, as a group, might gain from the Cooperators’ generosity as they end up earning 
more than them, when both are able to communicate. To gain further insight and thus try to 
understand why different types benefit differently from communication, I examine how 
subjects express themselves in the chat room. 
Cooperators seem to behave according to their commitments. They cooperate and contribute 
most of their endowments, on average. Even though Free Riders also make commitments to 
contribute and suggest common strategies, they do not seem to keep all of their promises. They 
are more likely to form mutual partnerships, compared to Cooperators, but Free Riders only 
contribute about half of their endowments, on average. Thus, Free Riders’ commitments seem 
to be partly cheap talk (Farrell 1987).  
Free Riders use singular pronouns as they give instructions to their potential partner and make 
attempts to reveal the other person’s future decisions, more often than Cooperators do. An 
example entry from a Free Rider might be “I’ll take 7 if you choose me” (session 4, period 3, 
subject 427). This might be a more efficient strategy, as Free Riders are the ones that end up 
benefiting from the opportunity to communicate through higher levels of payoff. Thus, when 
two people rely on a mutual agreement to work together, and when they may express themselves 
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This is an experiment on decisions. You are guaranteed 50 kroner as a show up payment. In 
addition, you will earn points during the experiment which will be converted into kroner. Your 
total payoff will be paid out to you in a closed envelope at the end of the experiment. This will 
be done anonymously. We first ask you to read the instructions. The experiment consists of 
three independent parts, what you do in one part does not affect the other two parts.  
 
You and another person can produce red units. Both of you will receive 10 blue units each 
which you can use in the production of red units. The number of red units depends on the 
number of blue units you and the other person use in the production.  
1 blue unit = 1 point = 1 krone 
1 red unit = 1 point = 1 krone 
 
After you receive 10 blue units you have to decide how many of the 10 blue units you wish to 
use to produce red units, and how many you wish to keep for yourself.  
The person you are producing with will also decide on how many blue units this person wants 
to use in the production of red units, and how many to keep. 
 
Your amount of points are determined as follows: 
Endowment of blue units = 10 – (the amount of blue units you use to produce red units) 
Endowment of red units = 0,7 x (the amount of blue units you use + the mount of blue units the  
       other person uses) 
Total number of points = endowment of blue units + endowment of red units  
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So that you may understand how your decisions affect your final payment, it is important that 
you read thoroughly through the examples on the next page. Please raise your hand if you have 
any questions.   
 
Some examples: 
1)   If you and the other person uses 0 blue units each, then 0 red units will be produced. 
Each person will receive a total of: 
10 – 0 + 0,7 x (0 + 0) = 10 points. 
2)   If you and the other person uses 5 blue units each, then 7 red units will be produced. 
Each person will receive a total of: 
10 – 5 + 0,7 x (5 + 5) = 12 points. 
3)   If you and the other person uses 10 blue units each, then 14 red units will be produced. 
Each person will receive a total of: 
10 – 10 + 0,7 x (10 + 10) = 14 points. 
4)   If you use 0 blue units and the other person uses 10 blue units, then 7 red units will be 
produced.  
You will receive a total of: 10 – 0 + 0,7 x (0 + 10) = 17 points. 
The other person will receive a total of: 10 – 10 + 0,7 x (0 + 10) = 7 points. 
Recall that 1 point = 1 krone 
 
PART I 
This is the first part of the experiment. You are randomly placed with another person which 
you can produce with. You will make the following decisions: 
1)   You have to choose how many of your 10 blue units you wish to use to produce red 
units. 
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2)   You have to choose how many of your 10 blue units you wish to use, conditional on the 
contribution choices of the other person. 
Neither you or the other person will be informed of each other’s decisions.  
A random draw will determine which of your two decisions that will be relevant for you final 
payoff. The points from this part of the experiment will be added to your total payoff.  
 
PART II 
This is the second part of the experiment. This part consists of 10 periods. Your payment is 
determined as before. You will have to make the same production decisions in each of the 10 
periods.  
 
In this experiment, you are person 𝒊. You will keep this number throughout the entire 
experiment. You may choose to produce with one other person in each period. The person you 
may choose to produce with have also been given a number, and this number belongs to the 
other person throughout the entire experiment. 
 
In each period, both you and the other person have to decide if you will produce together or 
not. Both of you have to choose each other for the production to take place. If you do not choose 
each other, no production will take place. If you miss a production period, your payoff will be 
equal to 0 in the current period.  
 
If the production takes place, each period lasts for 10 seconds. By this time you have to decide 
how many of your blue units you wish to use to produce red units. This is done by entering your 
decision in the blue box on the screen. You have to click the “Update” button when you have 
decided how many blue units you wish to use to produce red units. The production stage is 
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automatically closed after 10 seconds, and the number of blue units you have entered is 
registered as your final decision.  
 
At the end of each period, you will receive information about your endowment of blue and red 
units. The other person will also receive this information about its respective endowment.  
 
This is the end of the instructions. Please raise your hand if you have any questions. If you are 
ready to continue the experiment, press the “Ready” button. The experiment will start when 
everyone have pressed the “Ready” button.  
 
Chat message in the “Communication” condition 
At the beginning of each period you will be given the opportunity to chat electronically with 
the other person. The chat will last for 25 seconds in each period. To safeguard you own 
anonymity, we encourage you not to specify any personal information in the chat room. We 
also ask you to avoid inappropriate language.  
 
Partner decision message in both treatment conditions: 
You are person 𝒊. The person your chose, also chose you. You are producing with person 𝒋 in 
this period.  
Exclusion message: 
You are person 𝒊. The person you chose, did not choose you. 




This is the third part of the experiment. This part consists of only one period. You are 
randomly placed with another person which you can produce with. This person is not the same 
person who you have produced with previously in the experiment. You will make the following 
decisions: 
1)   You have to choose how many of your 10 blue units you wish to use to produce red 
units. 
2)   You have to choose how many of your 10 blue units you wish to use, conditional on the 
contribution choices of the other person. 
Neither you or the other person will be informed of each other’s decisions.  
A random draw will decide which of the two decisions will be relevant for you final payoff. 
The points from this part of the experiment will be added to your total payoff.  
 
You face the same two decisions as in the first part of the experiment, but you are free to choose 
what you want to answer. 
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APPENDIX B: CONSIDERING THE SELECTION BIAS 
 
I follow Heckman et al. (1998), as I explain how the contribution variable in my sample is 
affected by a selection bias. Let F = 1 signify the successful formation of a partnership, and F 
= 0 its absence. Furthermore, let 𝑃Z and 𝑃H signify each participant’s contribution to the 








Note: NC = “No communication”, C = “Communication”.  
 
The selection problem arises because I cannot observe both 𝑃Z and 𝑃H for each participant. 
Furthermore, I only observe each participant’s contribution (P) if F = 1, and not if F = 0. This 
makes 𝑃Z[\  and 𝑃Z\   in the illustration above, hypothetical contributions which I cannot observe. 
I observe P where 𝑃[\ = 𝐹𝑃H[\ + (1 − 𝐹)𝑃Z[\  in the “No communication” condition, and 
𝑃\ = 𝐹𝑃H\ + (1 − 𝐹)𝑃Z\  in the “Communication” condition. Thus, I cannot measure the causal 
effect of communication on contribution for all participants, only how the opportunity to 




“No communication” “Communication” 
F = 0 F = 1 F = 0 F = 1 







APPENDIX C: TRANSLATIONS OF THE SCREEN-SHOTS FROM Z-TREE  
 
FIGURE 1: CONDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION TABLE. 
Choose the amount of blue units you wish to use, if the person you produce with uses the 
following amount of its blue units. Help: Choose the amount of blue units you wish to use to 
produce red units for each choice made by the other person. To make a decision, write a number 
in each of the blue boxes and press “OK”. When you have pressed “OK”, the experiment will 
continue.  
 
FIGURE 2: CHAT ROOM. 
Write your message in the blue box and press the “enter” button on the keyboard. The chat 
room will automatically close when the time runs out. Period n of N.  
 
FIGURE 3: THE PARTNER CHOICE. 
You are person i. You may choose whether you wish to produce with person j or not. Help: If 
you want to produce with the other person, you must type the ID-number of the other person in 
the blue box and press “Update”. You may update your choice as often as you like. If you do 
not want to produce with the other person, you do not type anything in the blue box. When time 
runs out, your current choice will remain.  
 
FIGURE 4: THE PRODUCTION DECISION. 
You were endowed 10 blue units and may now choose how many you would like to use. Help: 
To change your current choice, you must write a number in the blue box and press “Update”. 
You may update your choice as often as you like. When time runs out, your current choice will 
remain. 
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APPENDIX D: INVITATION MAIL 
 
Hei! 
Du er invitert til et økonomisk eksperiment. Du vil motta 50 kroner for oppmøtet. I tillegg kan 
du tjene mer penger i løpet av eksperimentet. Hvor mye du tjener totalt, avhenger av valgene 
du tar. Eksperimentet går ut på å ta valg på en PC. Det er anonymt og det kreves ingen 




Eksperimentet tar omtrent 35 minutter, og finner sted onsdag 14. februar i Medborgerlaben, 2. 
etasje i Sofie Lindstrømshus, Rosenbergsgaten 35. Ved eventuelle spørsmål, send e-post til 
froydis.steine@student.uib.no 
 
Hilsen Frøydis Sæbø Steine 
Institutt for økonomi 
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 APPENDIX E: SUPPLEMENTARY REGRESSION RESULTS 














Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 82 groups in model (3) and 94 groups in model (1), (2) and 
(4)) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Participate indicates whether an individual has participated in an economic experiment 
prior to my experiment. 
(1)   Overall estimation results, with no controls.  
(2)   Estimation results, with controls. 
(3)   Estimation results in periods 1 – 5, with controls. 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All periods All periods Periods 1 – 5  Periods 6 – 10  
Communication 12.79*** -9.904 0.0401 15.90*** 
 (4.747) (6.815) (4.846) (5.140) 
     
Period  -3.065***   
  (0.591)   
     
Communication x Period  3.067***   
  (0.864)   
     
Female  -11.52*** -11.13** -11.88** 
  (4.194) (4.491) (4.741) 
     
Participate  8.337** 11.06** 6.873 
  (4.152) (4.584) (4.492) 
     
Constant 60.58*** 83.95*** 70.48*** 60.26*** 
 (3.223) (6.069) (5.257) (5.427) 
N 1330 1330 476 854 
adj. R2 0.029 0.078 0.041 0.081 
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TABLE E2: OLS REGRESSIONS. ESTIMATED EFFECT OF COMMUNICATION ON AVERAGE 
INDIVIDUAL PAYOFF (%). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All periods All periods Periods 1 – 5  Periods 6 – 10  
Communication 6.531 6.139 4.953 6.198 
 (4.524) (6.367) (5.400) (5.152) 
     
Period  7.281***   
  (0.582)   
     
Communication x Period  -0.103   
  (0.853)   
     
Female  -7.279* -10.01** -4.545 
  (3.926) (4.255) (4.556) 
     
Participate  1.041 -0.0442 2.126 
  (3.130) (3.935) (3.627) 
     
Constant 57.59*** 22.16*** 48.25*** 76.16*** 
 (3.341) (5.438) (5.485) (5.800) 
N 1980 1980 990 990 
adj. R2 0.005 0.222 0.011 0.011 
 
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 99 groups) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Participate 
indicates whether an individual has participated in an economic experiment prior to my experiment.  
(1)   Overall estimation results, with no controls.  
(2)   Estimation results, with controls. 
(3)   Estimation results in periods 1 – 5, with controls. 










TABLE E3: OLS REGRESSIONS. ESTIMATED EFFECT OF COMMUNICATION ON THE 
PROBABILITY OF FORMING A PARTNERSHIP FOR EACH TYPE. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Partnership Partnership Partnership 
    
Communication 0.0104 0.163* 0.0456 
 (0.0671) (0.0926) (0.0534) 
    
Cooperator  0.109 -0.0194 
  (0.0843) (0.0532) 
    
Free Rider -0.109  -0.129 
 (0.0843)  (0.0826) 
    
Others 0.0194 0.129  
 (0.0532) (0.0826)  
    
Communication x Cooperator  -0.153 -0.0352 
  (0.1000) (0.0746) 
    
Communication x Free Rider 0.153  0.117 
 (0.1000)  (0.0965) 
    
Communication x Others 0.0352 -0.117  
 (0.0746) (0.0965)  
    
Constant 0.656*** 0.546*** 0.675*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0861) (0.0377) 
N 1980 1980 1980 
adj. R2 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
Note: Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 99 groups) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
(1)   Overall estimation results, with Cooperator as baseline. 
(2)   Overall estimation results, with Free Rider as baseline. 










TABLE E4: OLS REGRESSIONS. ESTIMATED AVERAGE CONTRIBUTION (%) FOR EACH TYPE 
WITH AND WITHOUT COMMUNICATION.   
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Contribution Contribution Contribution 
    
Communication 13.37** 14.42 17.39*** 
 (6.285) (10.17) (5.375) 
    
Cooperator  27.20*** 11.76* 
  (8.636) (6.005) 
    
Free Rider -27.20***  -15.44** 
 (8.636)  (6.825) 
    
Others -11.76* 15.44**  
 (6.005) (6.825)  
    
Communication x Cooperator  -1.056 -4.024 
  (11.60) (7.951) 
    
Communication x Free Rider 1.056  -2.968 
 (11.60)  (10.99) 
    
Communication x Others  4.024 2.968  
 (7.951) (10.99)  
    
Constant 68.61*** 41.41*** 56.85*** 
 (5.270) (6.261) (3.115) 
N 1330 1330 1330 
adj. R2 0.092 0.092 0.092 
 
Note: Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 94 groups) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
(1)   Overall estimation results, with Cooperator as baseline. 
(2)   Overall estimation results, with Free Rider as baseline. 







TABLE E5: OLS REGRESSIONS. ESTIMATED EFFECT OF COMMUNICATION ON INDIVIDUAL 
PAYOFF (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Payoff Payoff Payoff 
    
Communication 1.754 15.35* 9.283* 
 (6.823) (9.020) (4.971) 
    
Cooperator  9.124 0.352 
  (8.464) (5.338) 
    
Free Rider -9.124  -8.772 
 (8.464)  (7.874) 
    
Others -0.352 8.772  
 (5.338) (7.874)  
    
Communication x Cooperator  -13.59 -7.529 
  (10.20) (7.460) 
    
Communication x Free Rider 13.59  6.064 
 (10.20)  (9.504) 
    
Communication x Others 7.529 -6.064  
 (7.460) (9.504)  
    
Constant 58.94*** 49.82*** 58.59*** 
 (4.813) (8.074) (3.328) 
N 1980 1980 1980 
adj. R2 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 
Note: Cluster- robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on 99 groups) * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
(1)   Overall estimation results, with Cooperator as baseline. 
(2)   Overall estimation results, with Free Rider as baseline. 










APPENDIX F: BAG-OF-WORDS IN NORWEGIAN 
 
 
TOPIC 1: PRONOUN (SINGULAR). 
Du, jeg, deg, meg, din, ditt, min, mitt. 
TOPIC 2: PRONOUN (PLURAL). 
Vi, oss, vår. 
TOPIC 3: COMMITMENTS AND RECRUITMENT. 
Begge, sammen, lover, pinkey, 10, ti, gi, gir, mye, mer, mest, øke, flere, bidra, kjør, best, enig, rettferdig, 
dele, samarbeid, svikt, full, pott, gass, velger, bra, fint, nice, glimrende, nydelig, supert, perfekt, sweet, 
happy, good, cool. 
TOPIC 4: EARNINGS, TACTICS. 
Tjene, profitt, uttelling, maksimere, størst, satser, gevinst, money, penger, investere, poeng, plan, taktikk, 
foreslå, forslag, varsle, produsere, produksjonsdel, produksjon, blå, rød, raud, deal, formelen, avtale, 
forhandle. 
TOPIC 5: CONFUSED. 
Forvirret, misforstå, forstå, confused, skjønte, skjønner. 
TOPIC 6: REGRET, EMOTIONS. 
Tilgitt, sorry, feil, feilet, taper, føler, rettferdig, feiger.  
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APPENDIX G: EXAMPLE ENTRIES IN NORWEGIAN 
 
 
TOPIC 1: PRONOUN (SINGULAR), ALL PERIODS. 
Session 2, period 3 
224: Du må velge meg  
Session 3, period 1 
323: Jeg velger 10 i første runde, velger du 
noe annet betyr det at jeg ikke kan stole 
på deg ): 
Session 3, period 5 
330: men du må jo velge meg da 
329: jepp 
Session 4: period 5 
421: Hvor mye produserer du med? Jeg  
velger alltid 10, vet ikke om 
det har noe å si for deg 
 
Session 4, period 3 
427: Hvor mange tar du? 
428: 6 
427: Jeg tar 7 hvis du velger meg 
428: ok 
Period 10 
427: Hvor mange tar du? 
428: tar 2 stk 
427: tar 3 
428: hva med deg? 
428: ok 
Session 5, period 8 
523: slenger ut mine små blå 
 
TOPIC 2: PRONOUN (PLURAL), ALL PERIODS. 
Session 1, period 1 
121: Er vi enige om at vi kjører 
      full pott? det vil jo 
gi størst uttelling 
122: Yes 
Session 1, period 2 
123: Ok! Men velger vi hverandre da? 
124: ja 
Session 1, period 1 
130: hva velger vi? 
129: Gi 10kr sammen i 10 runder? 
Session 3, periode 3 





323:       vi velger hverandre i resten av 
rundene? 
323: 10 hver runde? 
324: ja 
 
Session 3, period 4 




Session 3, period 6 
330: nice, vi fortsetter sånn? 
329: ja 
330: :D 
Session 5, period 2 
532: Gi 10 hver? Maksimere hver vår  
profitt + rettferdig 
532: Cool? 
531: ok 
Session 6,  period 1 
627: Hei, tror det lureste er at vi velger  
hverandre alle gangene 
Session 7, period 1 
729: Vi tjener mest hvis begge 




TOPIC 3: COMMITMENT AND RECRUITMENT, ALL PERIODS. 
Session 1, period 2 
124: 10 hver! 
124: kjør på 
123: Ok! Men velger vi hverandre da? 
124: ja 
Period 10 
124: ikke svikt meg nå! 
123: Vil aldri svikte deg <3 <3 <3 
124: 10 
123: Hvertall ikke på valentines 
124: pliz 
Session 2, period 3 
230: nice! 
229: fortsette sånn 10? 
230: fortsette sånn? 
229: jaa 
229: lett 
230: nydelig ;) 
Period 4 
230: boom 
229: keep it on 10!! 
230: cracking the system 
229: hahaha 
Period 5 
229: hell yeah 
230: og om en av oss feiger ut litt så har  
vi rett til å ikke bidra? 
230: ok? :P 
Session 3, period 1 





327: dette går jo bra 
328: Dette funker jo bra :) 
327: :) 
328: 10 igjen da? 
327: ja 
Period 9 
328: Samme? :) 
327: yeah :) 
328: supert :) 
327: nice :) 
Period 10 
327: føler vi er et bra team 
328: Jepp :) 
327: :) 
328: en siste gang nå :) 
327: yes 
Session 3, period 1 
332: 10 hver så får vi 14 poeng  
      begge to? :)  
331: skal vi gå for full pot ? 
332: jaa 
332: Let's do it :D 
Session 8, period 3 
828: hei, jeg har mange poeng, samarbeid  
med meg :) 
827: jeg har 4 
827: skal vi samarbeide? 
Period 4 
828: hei, jeg har 5 blå og fire røde 
827: har 3 blå og 10 røde 
828: samarbeide? 






TOPIC 4: EARNINGS OR TACTICS, ALL PERIODS.  
Session 2, period 1 
225: hei, vi satser maks hva? 
226: 5? 
225: 10! 
Session 3, period 2 
332: maks poengsum? 10 hver? 
331: høres bra ut 
Period 5 
331: så da sier vi 10 igjen 12 ? 




Session 7, period 1 
729: Vi tjener mest hvis begge 
      kjører full produksjon 
729: Er du med? 
730: ja 
Period 8:  
729: har du plan? 
730: eeh nei 
729: skal vi ta 5? 
730: ja 







821: Kva mange poeng? 
822: 8? 
821: avtale 
Session 8, period 6 
823: forslag til ny taktikk? 
823: begge tar 10? 
824: hadde vi gitt 10 hver gang  
      begge to hadde vi jo åpenbart  
      fått mest 
823: eller begge tar litt mindre 
Session 8, period 1 
825: Hardt ut på produksjon? 
825: tarzan 
825: hahhaha 
826: hardt ut 
Period 6 
825: går vi hardt ut igjen? 
825: i e for 
826: ja 
825: all in 
826: det er sånn begge får mest uten å  
fucke den andre 
Session 8, period 1 
828: jeg foreslår at vi velger å bruke 10  
annenhver gang, da tror jeg vi får mest 
poeng til samman 
 
 
 
 
